Software supply chains have become the Achilles heel of modern cybersecurity. Attackers realised something crucial several years ago: why break through the front door when you can poison the foundation?
The SolarWinds breach shocked the industry, but it shouldn’t have surprised anyone paying attention. Supply chain attacks increased by 742% between 2019 and 2024. The trend shows no signs of slowing.
Understanding the appeal from an attacker’s perspective helps. Compromising a single software vendor or component can grant access to hundreds or thousands of downstream organisations. That’s an astonishing return on investment for cybercriminals.
Open source dependencies compound the problem. The average application now includes hundreds of third-party libraries and packages. Each one represents a potential vulnerability. Developers trust these components implicitly, rarely examining their code or questioning their security.
William Fieldhouse, Director of Aardwolf Security Ltd, explains: “Supply chain vulnerabilities create cascading security failures. When we conduct penetration tests, we often find that the weakest link isn’t the client’s code but a forgotten dependency or third-party integration.”
Build processes present another attack vector. Continuous integration and deployment pipelines handle sensitive credentials, access production systems, and execute arbitrary code. Securing these pipelines requires the same attention as securing production applications. Comprehensive external network penetration testing reveals how attackers might exploit vendor relationships and third-party integrations to compromise your environment.
Malicious packages in public repositories pose a constant threat. Attackers upload packages with names similar to popular libraries, hoping developers make typos. They inject malicious code into legitimate-looking tools. Package managers download and execute this code automatically during installation.
Vendor management processes need serious upgrades. Most organisations still rely on questionnaires and attestations from suppliers. These provide minimal assurance. Real security requires verification, not trust. That means independent security assessments and continuous monitoring.
Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) documents help tremendously. They provide visibility into every component within your applications. When a new vulnerability emerges, you can quickly determine exposure across your entire portfolio. Without an SBOM, you’re guessing.
Implementing software composition analysis tools catches many issues automatically. These tools scan your dependencies, identify known vulnerabilities, and alert you to outdated components. They’re not perfect, but they’re vastly better than manual tracking.
Zero trust principles apply equally to supply chains. Don’t assume any component is safe simply because it’s widely used or comes from a reputable source. Verify everything. Limit access. Monitor behaviour. Treat every dependency as potentially hostile until proven otherwise. When you request a penetration test quote for supply chain assessment, you’re taking proactive steps to secure your entire software ecosystem.
Regular security assessments of your supply chain matter. The goal is discovering vulnerabilities before attackers exploit them, not after.
